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Abstract
When is it best for the Principal to commit not to disclosing all what she knows
in moral hazard interactions. I show that whenever the agent would choose the same
action under complete information at several distinct states, then full transparency
can generically be improved upon. This implies that full transparency is generically
suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the Principal exceeds
the dimension of the agent’s action. In a simple class of problems, I make further
progress on the best disclosure policy assuming the Principal can either disclose
fully the state or remain silent.
1 Introduction
A central question of economics is about how to provide the best incentives to agents in
an attempt to improve the working of organizations. Most of the literature in contract
theory concerned with this question has focused on how to use monetary instruments so
as to best align the objectives of the agents with those of the organization at a minimal
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cost. But, an equally important design question concerns the distribution of information
in organizations insofar as information aﬀects the perceived consequences of actions and
thus the incentives of agents.
Consider a Principal-agent relationship in which the agent must exert some eﬀort so
as to increase the chances of success of the task. The Principal does not observe eﬀort
directly, and she is informed at the time the task is to be completed about how diﬃcult it
is to achieve a successful outcome and how noisy it is to measure success in a reasonable
time scale where the agent is assumed to enjoy some exogenously set bonus in case a
positive signal about success is received ex post by the Principal.
A possible disclosure policy that I refer to as full transparency requires that the agent
be informed prior to making his eﬀort decision about the monitoring technology in the
hands of the Principal and how diﬃcult the task is. Alternative less transparent disclosure
policies would require that some aspects of the information held by the Principal be kept
unknown to the agent, as least until the completion of the task. The question studied
in this paper is whether full transparency should be expected to be the disclosure policy
that is most preferred by the Principal in such situations.
At some naive level, it would seem that irrespective of what the Principal observes
about the diﬃculty of the task, it is a good idea for the Principal when the monitoring
technology is poor not to let the agent know about it, given that a poor monitoring
technology translates in low incentives to exert eﬀort for the agent. But, if the agent
infers from the absence of communication on the monitoring technology that monitoring
is poor, the agent may not be induced to work more, and it is then unclear whether such
an opaque disclosure policy may be eﬀective.
The main result of this paper will imply that in situations like the moral hazard one just
described in which the information held by the Principal varies over more dimensions than
the action of the agent and the agent is assumed to make rational inferences from whatever
is being disclosed to him, full transparency is generically not the optimal disclosure policy.
It should be stressed that the conclusion that full transparency is not optimal in that moral
hazard scenario crucially relies on the possibility for the Principal to hide aspects that
concern both the quality of the monitoring technology and the diﬃculty of the task, and
it would not necessarily hold if the information held by the Principal were restricted to
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the quality of the monitoring technology (in contrast to what is suggested by the above
naive approach).1
To be more specific, I consider the transparency question in the context of the following
general abstract model. An agent is engaged in a moral hazard interaction parameterized
by a state . He must choose an action . Both the state  and the action  can be varied
locally. In state , action  results in an expected payoﬀ (; ) to the agent and an
expected payoﬀ (; ) to the Principal. Full transparency would require that the agent
be fully informed of the state  before making his choice of action . The question I am
interested in is whether other less transparent disclosure policies could be preferable for
the Principal. Or to put it diﬀerently, whether in expectation the Principal can achieve a
better outcome by having the agent be incompletely rather than completely informed of
the state .
In addressing the above transparency question, I have in mind that the distribution
of information about  provided to the agent is decided at an ex ante stage before the
realization of  is known to the Principal. Thus, the choice of disclosure policy does not
signal anything about which  is being observed by the Principal in the current interaction
of interest.2 I believe such a scenario fits in well with the application to organizations in
which due to a constant flow of new pieces of information the design of how information
is distributed is better thought of from an ex ante perspective. I also have in mind that
the agent is fully rational, in particular regarding the inference he makes from whatever
is being disclosed to him. I also assume that the Principal and the agent share a common
(correct) view about how the parameters are distributed in the economy.
In principle, one could consider arbitrary disclosure policies when addressing the above
transparency question, but in some applications, some choices of disclosure policy would
seem harder to implement (because they may require information devices that sound less
natural). Having this constraint in mind, I consider in some parts of the paper the case
1In particular, full transparency would be optimal in such a case with a fully rational agent whenever
the objective of the Principal is a suﬃciently convex function of the eﬀort of the agent.
2If the disclosure policy were chosen after the Principal observes the state , the work of Crawford
and Sobel (1982) on strategic information transmission suggests that not every information held by the
Principal would be transmitted to the agent, as soon as there is some conflict of interest between the
Principal and the agent (the Sender and the Receiver in their words). As I observe later, when addressing
the transparency question from an ex ante perspective as in this paper, full transparency is optimal in
the leading quadratic example considered by Crawford and Sobel.
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in which the Principal has only one option: Either disclose fully the state  to the agent
or remain silent and not say anything about the state.
The main result of this paper can be stated as follows. For generic organizational
objectives , the Principal can do strictly better than full transparency, as long as there
exist at least two distinct states 1 and 2 such that the action of the agent would be
the same at these two states in the fully transparent benchmark. And such a strict
improvement over full transparency can be achieved even if the Principal is restricted to
either disclosing fully the state or remaining completely silent for a well chosen subset of
states.
Before I elaborate on the result, note that in the Principal-agent scenario considered
above, the eﬀort level in the fully transparent case is positively aﬀected by a better
monitoring technology or by a more productive task. Thus, the same eﬀort level can be
achieved by having a more productive task that and a less good monitoring technology for
well chosen magnitudes, thereby ensuring that the main non-transparency result applies
to this scenario.
More generally, there will typically be several distinct states that would induce the
same choice of action in the fully transparent benchmark, as long as the dimension of the
state space exceeds the dimension of the action space of the agent. For such situations, my
main result says that full transparency is not optimal, and that full transparency can be
improved upon using a fairly simple disclosure device that only requires that the Principal
remains silent about the realization of the state for a well chosen subset of states.
Importantly, the same non-transparency result extends to situations in which in ad-
dition to the disclosure policy, the Principal can use monetary instruments to incentivize
the agent (as most of the contract theory assumes) and to situations with more than one
agent, covering applications such as moral hazard in teams. In all cases, full transparency
can be improved upon, as long as there exist at least two distinct states that would induce
the same choice of actions of the agents in the fully transparent benchmark.
To understand the main result of this paper, consider two distinct states 1 and 2 at
which the same action would be chosen in the full transparency benchmark. Assume, for
simplicity, that the action of the agent varies over one dimension, and consider a state +2
in the vicinity of 2 such that in the complete information benchmark the action at +2 is
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slightly larger than that at 2 and 1.
There are two basic forces that would lead the Principal to prefer that the agent be
uninformed as to whether the state is 1 or +2 . The first force is related to the relative
sensitivity of the Principal’s objective to the agent’s action at 1 and 2: Whenever the
Principal cares more about the agent exerting more eﬀort at 1 than at 2 (and the utility
function of the agent is equally concave at 1 and +2 ), keeping the agent in the dark is
good for the Principal because it will typically average the eﬀort made by the agent in the
two states, and thus, compared to the fully transparent benchmark, the agent will make
more eﬀort in state 1 and less eﬀort in state +2 , which is overall beneficial because the
Principal cares more about eﬀort in state 1 than in state +2 . The second force is related
to the relative concavity of the agent’s utility in eﬀort at 1 and +2 : Whenever the utility
function of the agent is suﬃciently more concave in eﬀort at +2 than at 1, keeping the
agent in the dark is good for the Principal because deviation from the optimal eﬀort is
more costly to the agent at +2 than at 1 and thus the opaque disclosure policy leads to
an eﬀort level (at both 1 and +2 ) closer to that at +2 , which is favorable to the Principal.
I provide later a sense of how the relative sensitivity of the Principal’s objective to the
agent’s eﬀort on the one hand and the relative concavity in eﬀort of the agent’s utility on
the other should be aggregated for the Principal to prefer that the agent be uninformed
as to whether the state is 1 or +2 . Whenever this condition holds, it is good not to let
the agent know whether the state is 1 or +2 . And whenever the condition does not hold,
I show that for generic specifications of the Principal’s objective, the Principal finds it
strictly beneficial not to let the agent know whether  is 1 or −2 where −2 is defined so
that 2 is in the middle between −2 and +2 . Thus, for generic organizational objectives,
the Principal is strictly better oﬀ either when the agent does not whether  = 1 or +2
or when he does not know whether  = 1 or −2 as compared with the full transparency
benchmark. Completing the proof that the Principal can gain in expected terms over the
full transparency benchmark requires that the agent be kept in the dark over a positive
measure of states, and such a result can be obtained using simple continuity arguments.
I note that the gain can be achieved even if the Principal is restricted to either disclosing
fully the state or remaining completely silent.
The above result does not say how much can be gained over full transparency. I illus-
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trate through the above moral hazard scenario that the gains over full transparency can be
arbitrarily large in relative terms. In the final part of the paper, I also characterize when
the Principal should optimally remain silent about the state in the context of a simple
class of problems that includes the above moral hazard application. I use these results to
shed some light on how to define the breadth of task assignments in organizations.
The transparency question addressed in this paper is closely related to the optimal
information disclosure question considered in Rayo and Segal (2010) or Tamura (2012) and
to the Bayesian persuasion question considered in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). These
authors (mostly) consider Sender-Receiver interactions without monetary instruments in
which the Sender possesses private information and the Receiver chooses an action based
on the information he has (or infers from the Sender’s communication). These papers
ask in specific contexts: Which disclosure policy the Sender should commit to so as to
maximize her expected payoﬀ? It should be noted that these papers do not consider the
possibility that the only option for the Sender is to remain silent or disclose fully the
state.
Rayo and Segal observe in their setup that transparency is not best when there are
no monetary instruments. Their result can be viewed as providing an illustration of
the main non-transparency result of this paper. In Rayo and Segal, the action of the
Receiver can be described as the probability of accepting the project proposed by the
Sender (even though in their model this action is derived from the random realization
of the Receiver’s outside option), and the state can be described as the profile of payoﬀs
the Sender and the Receiver would receive in case the project would be adopted. For
a given Receiver’s payoﬀ of implementing the project, the probability of acceptance of
the Receiver is the same irrespective of how valuable the project is to the Sender. Thus,
the key condition of the main Proposition of this paper is satisfied, thereby explaining
why full transparency can be improved upon in Rayo and Segal’ setup. In a later part of
their paper, Rayo and Segal observe that when the Sender can use monetary transfers,
full transparency becomes optimal. Yet, the transparency result they obtain when side-
payments are allowed would generically not hold when perturbing the Sender’s payoﬀ,
as the non-transparency result derived in Section 5 shows. While Rayo and Segal have
oﬀered an insightful exploration of the optimal disclosure policy in an interesting example,
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I believe the general treatment oﬀered in this paper provides a better account of why full
transparency should be expected to be suboptimal in general moral hazard interactions
with or without monetary instruments when the dimension of the state space exceeds the
dimension of the action space.3
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) mostly consider situations in which the state and the
action take values over discrete realizations, and they note that the optimal disclosure
policy typically involves a well adjusted noisiness in the precision of the transmission so
as to optimally let the agent be indiﬀerent over several actions in some instances. While
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) provide a general way to cope with such investigations,
I note that my setup makes an essential use of the possibility that the action and the
state be locally varied, which plays no role in Kamenica and Gentzkow. I also note
that their focus on Bayesian persuasion or on when it is best for the Sender to disclose
some information (as opposed to none) to the Receiver lies at the other extreme of the
non-transparency question considered in this paper.
The question addressed in this paper is also tangentially related to other strands of
literature. For example, some papers have shown in adverse selection environments such
as auctions or monopoly that it is best for the designer to transmit as much information as
possible to the agent(s) whenever the information of the designer is aﬃliated with the in-
formation of the agent(s).4 The main non-transparency result of this paper suggests that,
in moral hazard environments, when the information of the designer has more dimensions
than the action of the agent, there is no way (natural or not) to make full transparency
optimal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A general Principal-agent framework is
presented in Section 2. Preliminary considerations together with a preliminary investig-
ation of a leading moral hazard example are gathered in Section 3. Section 4 states, and
discusses the main non-transparency result. Section 5 considers the extensions to multi-
3In Section 5, I also discuss why the insight about the optimality of full disclosure in exchange for
well adjusted side-payments obtained by Eso and Szentes in an auction setup does not apply in general
here (essentially because the full information disclosure would not in general result in the maximization
of total welfare in typical moral hazard situations unlike in the auction setup). In a related vein, note
that Sobel (1993) observes that in the context of Principal-agent interacions with optimally adjusted
monetary instruments, full disclosure need not be optimal if the agent is not risk neutral.
4The relevant reference for auctions is Milgrom and Weber (1982), and for monopoly it is Ottaviani
and Prat (2001).
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agent settings and to the case in which side-payments are allowed. Section 6 considers
the optimal way to stay silent in a simple class of scenarios that includes Rayo-Segal’s
model as well as the above moral hazard environment. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Principal-Agent framework
I consider a family of moral hazard problems with one agent parameterized by a state
variable  ∈ R. The state  is assumed to be distributed according to a smooth (i.e., twice
continuously diﬀerentiable) density () that is strictly positive on some open bounded
subset of R. In every state , the agent chooses an action  in , an open subset of R.
In state , the expected payoﬀ to the agent is (; ) when the agent chooses . The
corresponding expected payoﬀ to the Principal is denoted by (; ). I assume that  is
a concave function of  that varies smoothly with . Moreover, I assume that whatever
, the function → (; ) is always maximized in a bounded subset of .5 The function
 is also assumed to be smooth (i.e., twice continuously diﬀerentiable).
The general theme I wish to explore is whether it is in the interest of the Principal
that the agent be informed of  whatever its realization before he makes his choice of
action . Specifically, I ask:
Question 1. When is it beneficial for the Principal that the agent be incompletely
informed of ? Or to put it diﬀerently, when is some form of non-transparency desirable?
When some form of non-transparency is desirable, it would be of interest to know
more about the best disclosure policy for the Principal. In some parts of the paper (when
putting more structure on the problem), I address the following question:
Question 2. Assuming the Principal can ex ante commit for each realization of  to
either telling what the realization of the state  is or remaining silent about this, what is
the best strategy for the Principal?
When addressing the above questions, observe that I am assuming that the Principal
can commit in advance (before knowing the realization of ) to the chosen disclosure
5Such an assumption will typically guarantee that one can work with first-order conditions to deal
with the maximization problem of the agent.
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policy. This implies that the choice of information disclosure policy cannot help the agent
in his estimate of , since that choice is made before the Principal knows . This is the
same ex ante view as the one adopted in Rayo-Segal (2010), Kamenica-Gentzkow (2011),
and it seems appropriate to deal with organizations in which there is enough time to
commit in advance (before the realization of  is known) to whatever disclosure policy
sounds best.
While question 2 does not deal with the most general form of communication strategy,
I believe that the option of remaining silent is a common (and widespread) communication
device. It is also fairly easy to implement. Of course, the premise of the analysis is that
the agent would make correct inferences as to how the state  is distributed from whatever
is being disclosed to him, including when the Principal remains silent.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Preference alignments
Clearly, if the Principal and the agent have the same preferences,  = , then full trans-
parency is best because in a decision problem one can only benefit from having more
information. In such a case, the best disclosure policy is for the Principal to tell the agent
the realization .
At the other extreme, if the Principal and the agent have completely opposed prefer-
ences in the sense that there exists a constant  such that for all  and , (; )+(; ) =
, then remaining completely silent as to what the realization of  is is the best disclosure
policy for the Principal, given that the more informed the agent, the better for him and
hence the worse for the Principal in this zero-sum context.
From these two basic observations, it would seem that the preference alignment between
the Principal and the agent is the main driving force behind the desirability of trans-
parency. Yet, consider the quadratic example of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which
preferences can be represented as:
(; ) = −(−  − )2
(; ) = −(− )2
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The Principal would like the action  of the agent to be as close as possible to the state 
whereas the agent would like this action to be as close as possible to +  where  can be
interpreted as measuring the size of the bias of the agent or the degree of misalignment
of the preferences of the agent and the Principal.
Interestingly, as also noted in Kamenica-Gentzkow (2011), in this quadratic example,
the best disclosure policy for the Principal is full transparency no matter how big  is,
the reason being that anyway the agent will apply the bias  to his choice of  and given
the concavity of → −(− )2 it is never in the interest of the Principal that the agent
be incompletely informed about .6
3.2 Basic considerations
The Crawford-Sobel quadratic example casts doubt as to whether the misalignment of
preferences of the Principal and the agent is the key driving force behind the desirability
of non-transparency. In this subsection, I suggest that two forces may lead the Principal
to prefer a non-fully transparent disclosure policy. These two forces will later be used to
interpret most of the results derived next.
To formulate these two forces, I consider the case of the bundling of two states 1 and
2 into one information set  = {1 2} for the agent, and I illustrate two extreme cases in
which the Principal may prefer this to letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2. The
first of these cases is related to the relative concavity of the agent’s utility function with
respect to his own action at these two states while the second of these cases is related
to the relative sensitivity of the Principal’s utility function with respect to the agent’s
action.7
To present this most simply, assume that the action space  is one-dimensional. When
6When several  belong to the same information set , the agent picks  = ( |  ∈ ) +  and
conditional on  ∈  the Principal gets −[( − )2 |  ∈ ] which is less (by Jensen’s inequality) than
−( −( |  ∈ ))2 = −2. Given that −2 is what the Principal gets under full transparency, we get
the desired conclusion that transparency is optimal whatever  (and whatever the distribution of ).
7A third eﬀect in favor of non-transparency one might think of is related to the concavity of the
principal’s payoﬀ function  with respect to the agent’s action , but this turns out not to play any role
in the derivation of the non-transparency result, as will be explained next.
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the agent knows the state , he picks action
() = argmax (; )
When the agent does not know whether  is 1 or 2, he picks action
 = argmax [(1)(; 1) + (2)(; 2)]
Assume further that (2)  (1). The concavity of → (; ) for all  ensures that
(1)    (2)
Relative concavity of 
Clearly, if (·; ) is much more concave at 2 than at 1 -in the sense that
¯¯¯
2
2 (·; 2)
¯¯¯
is suﬃciently (and uniformly) bigger than
¯¯¯
2
2 (·; 1)
¯¯¯
- then a deviation at 2 from (2)
would be too costly (as compared with a deviation from (1) at 1) and thus  must be
close to (2). To the extent that (·; ) is increasing in , the Principal strictly benefits
from the agent not knowing whether  = 1 or 2 in such a case.
Relative sensitivity of 
For a given (·; ), if the principal cares much more about the agent’s eﬀort  at 1
than at 2 -in the sense that ¯¯ (·; 1)¯¯ is suﬃciently (and uniformly) bigger than¯¯ (·; 2)¯¯-
then the increase of  (from (1) to ) at 1 will more than compensate (in terms of
Principal’s payoﬀ) the decrease of  (from (2) to ) at 2 so that the Principal strictly
prefers that the agent be uninformed as to whether  = 1 or 2.
The two basic eﬀects of relative concavity of  and relativity sensitivity of  will play
a key role in the rest of the paper.
3.3 An illustrative example
In order to fix the kind of applications I have in mind, consider the following moral hazard
scenario. An agent must choose an eﬀort level  ∈ [0 1] to increase the chance of success
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of a task. Eﬀort  gives a private benefit  ·  (e.g. proportional to ) to the agent. The
cost of exerting eﬀort  is () = 
2
2 where  can be interpreted as a parameter defining
the degree of decreasing returns to scale in the activity. Depending on the eﬀort , the
probability of success for the organization is  where   1. Success is not directly
observed by the Principal (because there are many activities in the organization and it
is not obvious to pin down whether an isolated activity is successful or not). What the
Principal observes is a signal  which can take two values  = 1 or 0. The observation of
 provides a noisy signal as to whether the activity is successful. Specifically, assume that
Pr( = 1 | ) =   1
2
. The agent receives a bonus of 1 in case  = 1 is observed.
The Principal receives an extra benefit  in case of success. Both the Principal and the
agent are assumed to be risk neutral.
The state that describes the interaction can be parameterized by  = (    ).
In a given state  with eﬀort level , the expected utility of the agent writes
[ + (1− )(1− )] + − 
2
2
where the first (resp. second) term in the bracket represents the probability that the
Principal observes  = 1 and the task is successful (resp. non-successful) and thus the
overall term in bracket represents the expected bonus received by the agent when exerting
eﬀort .
The corresponding expected utility of the Principal writes:
[− (2 − 1)]− (1− )
For future reference, one can rewrite the agent and Principal’s expected payoﬀs as (P)
(; ) = − 
2
2 +
(; ) = + 0
where  =  − (1− ) + ,  = ,  = [− (2 − 1)],  = 1−  and  0 = −(1− ),
and redefine  to be (   0).
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In this class of problems, if the agent is uncertain as to which state he is facing, he
picks action8
 = ()()
where the expectation is computed according to the belief of the agent regarding the state.
The expected payoﬀ of the principal in the corresponding range of states amounts to
()()
() +
0
These expressions allow in principle to compare the eﬀect on the Principal’s expected
payoﬀ of any disclosure policy.
Just to illustrate how much can be gained with non-transparency, assume that there
are two states equally likely in which only  and  vary (specifically, assume  = 0,
 =  = 1). The monitoring technology takes two possible forms: Either the signal
 received by the Principal is totally uninformative about success so that  = 1
2
, or the
signal  is perfectly informative so that  = 1. Moreover, when the signal is uninformative
about success, the sensitivity of success to eﬀort is highest with  = 1, and when the signal
 is perfectly informative about success, the sensitivity of success to eﬀort is lower and
 =   1. In such a case, non-transparency gives an expected payoﬀ to the Principal
proportional to (1 + ), whereas transparency gives an expected payoﬀ proportional
(with the same coeﬃcient) to ()2. The gain of non-transparency in relative terms is
then
1−
2 and it can be made arbitrarily large as  is made smaller and smaller. Here
non-transparency is good because it allows to incentivize the agent to exert more eﬀort
in the state in which eﬀort induces more success.
Observe that in the two state scenario just considered if  and (2−1) were positively
(instead of negatively) correlated, then transparency over these two states would be better
than non-transparency. Yet, as I show later, in cases like the one considered here in which
the same action () would be chosen at several states were the agent to be fully informed
of the state, one can always find a set of states so that if the agent is not told which state
in the set occurred, the Principal is strictly better oﬀ than if the agent is fully informed
of the state.
8I am assuming that in the range of relevant , one has 0  ()()  1.
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It should be mentioned that the model studied by Rayo and Segal (2010) can be cast
in the class (P) by letting  = 1,  =  0 = 0 and interpreting  as the probability of
acceptance of the project by the receiver,  as the value to the Sender of the project and
 as the value to the Receiver of the project. While Rayo and Segal assume acceptance is
decided after the Receiver observes his outside option (which is assumed to be distributed
according to a uniform distribution), one gets the same acceptance probability as the one
arising from problem (P) as specified with  = 1, thereby explaining the equivalence of
the two formulations.
An important observation made by Rayo and Segal is that if two states (1 1) and
(1 2) are unordered in the sense that 2  1 implies that 2  1, then it is preferable
not to let the agent know whether the state is (1 1) or (1 2). This observation can be
related to the above identification of the role of the relative sensitivity of  with respect
to the agent’s eﬀort. Indeed, within that specification, 2  1 implies that the action at
state (2 2) is larger than at state (1 1), since  =  for  = 1 2, and since  = ,
the condition 2  1 precisely means that in the state in which the full information eﬀort
would be smaller, the Principal cares more about eﬀort, thereby explaining through the
lens of the basic considerations proposed in Section 3.2 the reason for Rayo and Segal’s
observation. I will come back to Rayo and Segal later in the paper including when I
discuss the eﬀect of allowing for monetary payments and discussing the optimal way of
remaining silent in the context of problem (P).
4 Non-transparency
In this Section, I establish quite generally that if the same action  were to be chosen
in at least two distinct states 1, 2 in the benchmark scenario in which the agent would
be fully informed of the state, then for generic objective functions , the designer can
achieve a strictly higher expected payoﬀ by not disclosing fully . Thus, some form of
non-transparency is desirable. As a corollary, I obtain that full transparency is not the
optimal disclosure policy whenever the dimension of the state space exceeds the dimension
of the action space because in such cases there must exist distinct states that induce the
same choice of action in the complete information benchmark.
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4.1 The basic non-transparency result
To establish my first non-transparency result, let me denote by () = argmax (; ).
I will assume that for all , there is always a direction  of  such that

∇((); ) 6= 0
where∇ refers to the gradient of  with respect to . When  satisfies this assumption,
I say that  is non-satiated. Such an assumption typically implies that maxima () are
never locally constant (it is in fact equivalent to this). It should typically be thought of
as a fairly weak assumption as such a direction of  may for example correspond to a
reduction in the marginal cost of producing eﬀort in some of the tasks to be fulfilled by
the agent. This assumption was trivially met in the moral hazard scenario considered in
Section 3.
I will also need to define formally what I mean by generic objective functions .
I provide below a set theoretic definition of genericity (so as to deal with the space of
objective functions in great generality) but note that a measure theoretic definition would
work equally well if I were to consider that objective functions can only take polynomial
forms, say. Formally, let  = R × R denote the domain of the objective functions .
Consider functions that are twice continuously diﬀerentiable  ∈ 2(). The set Π of
 ∈ 2() is endowed with a Whitney 2 topology by letting a sequence  ∈ Π converge
to  if and only if  −  as well as the Jacobian of  −  and the matrix of second
derivative of  −  converge uniformly to zero in the space of continuous functions over
the relevant range of ,  (assumed to be bounded, see above). Genericity is defined as:
Definition. A set Π ⊆ Π is generic in Π if it contains a set that is open and dense in
Π.
The first main result is:
Proposition 1 Assume that there exist two distinct states 1, 2 in the interior of the -
space such that the same action would be chosen in the complete information benchmark,
i.e. (1) = (2). Assume that the utility function  is non- satiated. There exists a
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generic set Π such that for all objective functions  ∈ Π, the Principal can do strictly
better than disclosing fully the state  to the agent.
The general case covered by Proposition 1 is shown in Appendix. I now provide a
detailed intuition for the case in which the action space is one-dimensional  ∈ R. The
complete information solution () satisfies: ((); ) = 0. Let 1 and 2 6= 1 be such
that (2) = (1), as allowed by the Proposition, and consider a direction  such that
2
 ((1); 2) 6= 0, as allowed by the non-satiation of .
Consider the states  = 1 and 2 +  for  either positive or negative but small
(remember 2 lies in the interior of the -space). The central part of the argument
consists in comparing the aggregate expected payoﬀ to the Principal when the agent
knows whether  = 1 or 2+  and the expected payoﬀ to the Principal when the agent
ignores whether  = 1 or 2 + . From there, it will be relatively straightforward to
conclude that the Principal can strictly gain in expected terms as compared with the full
information benchmark.
Clearly for  = 0, the two informational scenarios generate the same aggregate expec-
ted value of . This is because the same action being optimal for the agent at 1 and 2
((1) = (2)), the uncertainty as to whether  = 1 or 2 still leads the agent to find
(1) = (2) optimal. But, for  6= 0, the two solutions will not in general lead to the
same aggregate eﬀect on . I will now compute the first order eﬀect in  of this diﬀerence
and show that it is generically diﬀerent from 0, thereby allowing me to conclude that
a coarse information of the above type either for   0 and small or   0 and small
dominates the complete information benchmark.
Let 1 = (1) and 2() = (2 + ). They satisfy

(1; 1) = 0 (1)

(2(); 2 + ) = 0
Let () denote the action when the agent does not know whether  = 1 or 2+ .
It satisfies:
(1) (
(); 1) + (2 + ) (
(); 2 + ) = 0
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I wish to sign ∆() defined as
(1)[(1; 1)− ((); 1)] + (2 + )[(2(); 2 + )− ((); 2 + )]
Clearly, if ∆()  0, it is strictly better that the agent does not know whether  = 1 or
2 + .
I now expand ∆() at the first order in . Since (0) = 2(0) = 1, ∆() writes at
the first order:
(1) (1; 1)[1 − 
()] + (2) (1; 2)[2()− 
()] + ()
where () denotes a function such that () goes to 0 as  goes to 0.
Moreover from (1) (and using that 22  0 is diﬀerent from 0), one has that:
2()− 1 = −
2
 (2)
2
2 (2)
+ ()
()− 0 = −(2)
2
 (2)
(1)22 (1) + (2)22 (2)
+ ()
where  denotes the derivative of (an arbitrary function denoted)  in the direc-
tion  and all functions are taken at  = 1.
After multiplying∆() by 22 (2)[(1)22 (1)+(2)22 (2)] and dividing by (1)(2)
(which are both strictly positive) I get that ∆() has the same sign as
∙
 (1)
2
2 (2)−

 (2)
2
2 (1)
¸ 2
 (2)+ ()
Three cases may a priori occur.
1)
h

 (1)22 (2)−  (2)22 (1)
i
2
 (2)  0. Then taking   0 and suﬃciently
small, I can infer from the above that not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or
2 +  strictly dominates the complete information benchmark.
2) Likewise, if
h

 (1)22 (2)−  (2)22 (1)
i
2
 (2)  0, then taking   0 and
suﬃciently small, not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2+  strictly dominates
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the complete information benchmark (remember than since 2 is in the interior of the
-space, one can move in any direction from 2).
3) The only case in which one cannot conclude is when
∙
 (1)
2
2 (2)−

 (2)
2
2 (1)
¸ 2
 (2) = 0
or 
 (1)
2
2 (2)−

 (2)
2
2 (1) = 0 (2)
But, this condition is not satisfied for generic  functions.
To see this formally, consider the family of  functions
(; ) = (; ) +  k  − 1 k2
where  ∈ R and k  − 1 k denotes the euclidean distance between  and 1. Obviously,
if  satisfies (2), then for  6= 0,  does not satisfy (2) -observe that changing  does not
aﬀect the expressions of 2(), ()- from which one can conclude that the set of  for
which (2) does not hold is dense. Moreover, this set is also open given the continuity of
the mapping  →  (1)22 (2)−  (2)22 (1) according to the Whitney 2 topology.9
The rest of the argument, in particular showing how one can induce a strict gain in
expectation (integrating over all possible realizations of ) relies on a simple continuity
argument. If not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2+  is strictly preferable to
full transparency (as just considered) then there must exist (small enough) neighborhoods
1 , 2 of 1 and 2 +  respectively, such that not letting the agent know  ∈ 1 ∪
2 induces an expected (strictly) positive gain in terms of the Principal’s objective as
compared with the full information benchmark. Observe that this gain can be achieved
even in the scenario in which the Principal is constrained either to disclose the state 
or to remain silent (as considered later in the simple class (P) introduced at the end of
Section 3).
9Clearly, if one were to consider polynomial functions , then (2) would not hold for a measure 1 set
of parameter values.
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4.2 Discussion
In this subsection, I first interpret the two-state construction shown above in light of the
basic considerations made in Section 3. I then show the implication of Proposition 1 for
the case in which the dimension of the state space is higher than the dimension of the
action space.
4.2.1 Why is full transparency dominated?
Suppose in the two-state scenario considered immediately after Proposition 1 that the
action of the agent is strictly larger at 2 +  than at 1, that is, (2 + )  (1).
If the Principal is more sensitive to eﬀort at 1 than at 2 in the sense that  (1) 

 (2)while the agent’s utility function has the same concavity at the two states (22 (1) =
2
2 (2)), then not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2 +  is good for the Prin-
cipal because it allows to transfer some eﬀort made in state 2 +  to state 1 and the
Principal is more sensitive to extra eﬀort in state 1.
Alternatively, if the Principal is equally sensitive to the agent’s eﬀort in states 1 and
2 ( (1) =  (2)  0) and the agent’s utility function is more concave at 1 than at 2
in the sense that | 22 (1) || 22 (2) | then not letting the agent know whether  = 1
or 2 +  is good for the Principal. This is because deviation from the optimal eﬀort is
more costly at 2 +  than at 1 and thus keeping the agent in the dark will lead to an
eﬀort level (at both 1 and 2 + ) closer to that at 2 + , which is favorable to the
Principal (because the eﬀort at 2+  in the complete information case is assumed to be
larger than that at 1).
The above two cases for non-transparency are, of course, closely related to the basic
observations made in Section 3. Incorporating both eﬀects of the relative sensitivity of 
to  on the one hand and the relative concavity of  on the other reveals that not letting
the agent know whether  = 1 or 2 +  dominates full transparency whenever
− 22 (1)  −

22 (2) (3)
which provides an exact expression of how the two eﬀects should be aggregated.
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Observe that the key observation behind Proposition 1 is that either (3) is satisfied
and not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2 +  is good for the Principal or
else one should generically have that − 22 (1)  − 22 (2) and then not letting the
agent know whether  = 1 or 2 −  is good for the Principal.
Two remarks may be worth making here. First, it should be noted that the argument
developed above makes no use of the concavity of the objective function  with respect to
. One might have conjectured that the concavity of  would play a role in the argument
given that a coarser information of the agent reduces the variability of the action with the
state and this reduced variability would seem to be favorable to the Principal whenever
 is concave in . Yet, as Proposition 1 implies, the desirability of some form of non-
transparency holds no matter whether  is concave or not, in particular even in cases in
which  would be extremely convex.
The reason for this seemingly surprising result is that by considering the bundling of
the states  = 1 or 2 +  which are such that (1) = (2), the concavity of  has an
eﬀect of order 2 on the comparison as to whether the Principal prefers that the agent be
uninformed about the state (by contrast, the previous highlighted eﬀects are of order ).
As a result, the concavity of  plays no role as to whether some form of non-transparency
may be desirable under the assumptions made in Proposition 1. Another way to phrase
this is that the choice of information structure made above is such that the eﬀect of the
concavity of  is frozen and only the relative concavity of  and the relative sensitivity
of  with respect to  play a role. Of course, the concavity of  with respect to  will
play a role as to what exact form of information disclosure is best for the Principal. But
no matter what  looks like, some form of non-transparency will be desirable, as long as
there exist at least two distinct states that would induce the same choice of action in the
complete information benchmark.10
It should also be stressed that if in the above construction, I had considered 2 = 1,
then the first-order eﬀects as expressed above would cancel out (this can be seen by
10In relation to the latter point, it can be said that if I had considered two distinct states 1, 2 with
(1) 6= (2), then the concavity of  would have played a non-negligible role in the assessment as to
whether the Principal would be better oﬀ when the agent does not know the state  ∈ {1 2}. More
precisely, it is readily verified that, for suﬃciently convex , the Principal would have been strictly better
oﬀ in the full information benchmark as compared with the situation in which the agent does not know
whether  = 1 or 2.
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plugging 2 = 1 in the above expressions), and thus whether the Principal is better oﬀ
when the agent knows whether  = 1 or 1 +  would involve a comparison of order
2 and it would thus not be possible to conclude that some form of non-transparency is
desirable (considering the bundling of 1 or 1− as compared with the fully transparent
benchmark would now have an eﬀect of the same sign as the bundling of 1 or 1+, and
as a matter of fact, it may well be then that full transparency dominates as illustrated in
the quadratic example of Crawford-Sobel).
Comment. As can be inferred from the above, in the case in which the dimension of
the action space is 1, the relative density () around  = 1 and 2 plays no role as to
whether the Principal is better oﬀ when the agent does know whether  = 1 or 2 + .
However, when the action space has a dimension larger than 1, this relative density may
play a role. Inspecting the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix reveals this.
4.2.2 When the state space has more dimensions than the action space
A simple corollary of Proposition 1 is obtained when the state  ∈ R varies over more
dimensions than the action  ∈ R, i.e   . Indeed in such a case, there are typically
many diﬀerent states  that induce the same action in the full information benchmark.
Specifically, given the smoothness of , for almost any 1,
Θ(1) = { such that () = (1)}
defines a manifold of dimension − (see, for example, Milnor (1965), chapter 2). Thus
one can find 2 6= 1 such that (2) = (1). As a consequence of Proposition 1, I can
state:
Theorem 1 Suppose the dimensionality of the state  is strictly bigger than the dimen-
sionality of the action  of the agent, that is,   , and suppose the utility of the agent
is non-satiated. Then there exists a generic set Π such that for all objective functions
 ∈ Π, some non-full disclosure of  to the agent is strictly beneficial to the Principal as
compared with the full information benchmark.
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I think that the scope of application of Theorem 1 is significant given that in many
applications it would seem reasonable to believe that the state varies over more dimensions
than the action. In the leading example of Section 3, the state included as many as five
dimensions whereas the action space was one-dimensional, the action taking the form
of an eﬀort level. Thus, the condition of Theorem 1 is clearly satisfied in this class
of problems. Moving into the territory of multi-tasking in which the dimension of the
action space would be greater, one should have in mind that the type of signals that
the Principal observes would then be of greater richness and also that the state would
include descriptions of how complementary the tasks of the agent are to the working of
the organization (about which the Principal could get noisy signals), thereby suggesting
that    is still a good assumption in applications of this sort.
In some applications, it may be hard not to let the agent know about some aspects
of the state. For example, if the state includes a description of the private costs incurred
by the agent when exerting a certain type of eﬀort, it would seem natural to assume that
the agent knows about this no matter what disclosure policy is chosen by the Principal.
With this constraint in mind, one should reinterpret Theorem 1 as follows: Some form of
non-transparency is desirable, as long as the number of dimensions of the state that can
be hidden to the agent is strictly larger than the number of dimensions of the action to be
chosen by the agent. I believe such a dimensional gap between what can be hidden from
the state and the action of the agent is quite common in applications, and the leading
example of the paper provides a natural illustration of this.
Comment. To illustrate why the non-transparency conclusion of Theorem 1 does not
hold whenever the action space and the state space have the same dimension, one can
specialize the above moral hazard example and assume that the only parameter that varies
is the sensitivity of success to eﬀort as measured by .11 The desirability of transparency
in this case should sound economically intuitive. If the only heterogeneity lies in the
sensitivity  of success to eﬀort, the Principal would like the highest eﬀort to be made
when success is easier to achieve, which is most eﬃciently obtained when the agent knows
more about the state.
11It is readily verified that full transparency dominates any form of non-transparency using Jensen’s
inequality (and the convexity of → 2).
22
5 Extensions
In this Section, I establish the robustness of the non-transparency insight derived in
Section 4 in two directions. First, I consider the case of several agents. Second, I allow for
the possibility of using optimally designed monetary instruments. In both extensions, I
observe that the non-transparency insight holds, as long as the dimension of what can be
hidden to the agent(s) exceeds the dimension of the action(s). Thanks to these extensions,
I believe the scope of application of the main non-transparency insight of this paper is
quite large.
5.1 Multi-agent interactions
Compared to the model described in Section 2, I allow for the presence of several agents
 ∈ . Each agent must now simultaneously choose an action  ∈  where  is an open
subset of R. The state is still denoted by  and it belongs to R. When the profile of
actions is  = () and the state is , the utility derived by agent  is denoted by (; ),
and the payoﬀ to the Principal is denoted by (; ). All utility functions are assumed to
be smooth (i.e. twice continuously diﬀerentiable) functions of the relevant variables, and
for each agent ,  is assumed to be concave in .
In the fully transparent benchmark, for each state , the play of agents is described
by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding normal form game. I denote by () =
( ())∈ the action profile that would be played in state . I will assume that in
some open neighborhood of states, () varies smoothly (i.e. in a twice continuously
diﬀerentiable fashion) with , and in the rest of this Section I am assuming the state space
is included in such a neighborhood.12
As in Section 4.1, I will assume in the following Proposition that there are two distinct
states 1 and 2 such that  (1) =  (2) for some agent . Consider the Bayesian
12For every , an equilibrium in pure strategies exists thanks to our concavity assumption. From the
Nash equilibrium correspondence, I am considering here a selection that varies smoothly with  (which
can be done thanks to our smoothness assumptions at least locally using again the techniques of topology
from the diﬀerentiable viewpoint, Milnor 1965).
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game in which agent  does not know whether  = 1 or 2, while agents other than
 know the state. One Bayes Nash equilibrium of this Bayesian game would result in
the same distribution of action profiles as in the complete information benchmark. Also,
thanks to the smoothness assumptions, if agent  is uninformed as to whether  = 1 or
2 +  for some direction  and some scalar , there will exist a Bayes Nash equilibrium
of the corresponding Bayesian equilibrium that varies smoothly with  and such that
it converges to the complete information Nash equilibrium  as  goes to 0. When
considering Bayesian games, I make the assumption that the play follows such a Bayes
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume that there exist two distinct states 1, 2 in the interior of the
-space such that the same action would be chosen by agent  in the complete information
benchmark, i.e.  (1) =  (2), and that the utility function  of agent  is non-
satiated.13 There exists a generic set Π such that for all objective functions  ∈ Π, the
Principal can do strictly better than disclosing fully the state  to the agents.
A first observation is that it is not possible to infer Proposition 2 from Proposition 1
simply by specifying exogenously how agents  6=  chose their actions () as a function
of the state . The reason why such an approach would fail is that the actions () would
typically depend on the information structure of agent  in a Bayes Nash equilibrium and
thus () cannot be held fixed (while changing the information structure of agent ).
Despite this, the argument to prove Proposition 2 is very similar to that used to prove
Proposition 1. Consider the incomplete information setting in which agents other than 
know the state, and agent  does not know whether  = 1 or 2+ where  is a direction
such that ∇((2); 2) 6= 0. The key step consists in showing that the diﬀerence
of Principal’s expected payoﬀ in this incomplete information setting and in the complete
information benchmark is of the same order as  for generic  functions, and thus either
  0 or   0 but small would ensure the strict superiority of the incomplete information
scenario. The argument is detailed in the Appendix.
13Non-satiation is defined here with respect to , i.e., ∀, ∃ such that ∇((); ) 6= 0.
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As in the one agent case, if the dimension  of the state  is strictly bigger than the
dimension  of the action  of at least one agent , then the conditions for Proposition 2
will be satisfied for this agent, and thus some form of non-transparency will be desirable.
In the arguments just developed, I have allowed the Principal to use a diﬀerent dis-
closure policy for the various agents. If the disclosure policy must be the same for all
agents, then the same conclusion as that in Proposition 2 can be reached, as long as there
exist two distinct states 1, 2 such that the same action profile would be chosen at the
two states in the complete information benchmark, i.e. (1) = (2). As a corol-
lary, I can infer that some form of non-transparency is desirable in the public information
disclosure case, as long as the dimension  of  is strictly larger than the sum Σ of
dimensions of  over all agents  ∈ .
5.2 Monetary instruments
Monetary instruments can be used in several ways. First, one can think of the Principal
who possesses private information on  as being able to sell her information to the agent.
The diﬀerence with the previous analysis is that now the Principal is not reduced to
disclose freely some aspects of her information. She can disclose this in exchange for
side-payments. Second, in the tradition of contract theory, monetary instruments can be
used to better align the incentives of the agent with the interest of the Principal making
the side-payments contingent on what the Principal observes ex post. In both cases, it is
of interest to review what happens to the main non-transparency result derived above.
5.2.1 The sale of information
A simple way to model that information can be sold is to assume that some bargaining
between the Principal and the agent takes place at the ex ante stage before the realization
of  is known where bargaining bears on which disclosure policy the Principal will commit
to in exchange for side-payments.
It is not diﬃcult to see that the non-transparency result as described in Proposition 1
or Theorem 1 continues to hold in such a setting no matter what the exact details of the
bargaining protocol are.
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To see this most simply, assume that the utilities of the Principal and the agent are
quasi-linear in money (where the dependences of  and  with respect to  and  are
still assumed to be of the most general form). Then, bargaining necessarily results in the
maximization of  + , and it is not diﬃcult to infer from Proposition 1 that, as long
as the utility function  of the agent is non-satiated and there are two distinct states 1,
2 such that the same action would be chosen in the complete information benchmark,
i.e. (1) = (2), then full transparency is not the optimal disclosure policy for generic
objective functions  (because genericity of + as confined to the set of preferences that
are quasi-linear in money immediately translates into genericity of  viewed as a function
of ( )). The same conclusion would also hold true in the case of non-quasi-linear utilities
even though the argument would have now to make more precise the bargaining protocol
as it may now have an impact on which disclosure policy would be adopted.
It is worth contrasting the above argument with the result obtained by Eso and Szentes
(2007) who show that it is optimal for the seller of a good to disclose as much as she can
to potential buyers in a context of private value auctions with quasi-linear preferences.
Assuming away the private information of the buyers, it is readily verified that in the
context studied by Eso and Szentes, the welfare-maximizing outcome can be achieved
whenever the seller discloses all what she knows, thereby explaining Eso-Szentes’ insight
in terms of the optimal disclosure policy. Yet, in general moral hazard problems, even
assuming utilities are quasi-linear in money, there is no reason why full disclosure would
result in the maximization of total welfare, and thus the full transparency insight of Eso
and Szentes does not extend to such contexts.
5.2.2 Side-payments as incentive instruments
A full description of the state  should in general include a specification of what the
Principal observes ex post and how this is aﬀected by the action  of the agent. To
simplify, assume that the Principal can only observe a finite number  of signals  = 1 .
Then the monetary instrument available to the Principal can be described as a vector
 = () ∈ R+ specifying the side-payment assumed to be non-negative or bonus
 ∈ R+ the agent would receive from the Principal in case the Principal observes 
ex post. In state , action  would result in a probability distribution over  that I
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denote by (· | ) , and I assume that for all ,  and , ( | )  0.14 Agent’s
expected payoﬀ is (; ) when  prevails, the state is , and the agent chooses .
The corresponding expected payoﬀ to the Principal is denoted by (; ), and it is
assumed to be decreasing in . All functions are assumed to vary smoothly (i.e., in
a twice continuously diﬀerentiable fashion) with   . Besides  is assumed to be a
concave function of  for all  and . Moreover, I assume that the function → (; )
is always maximized in a bounded subset of ,15 and I denote the maximand by ( ).
Finally, I denote by () the bonus scheme that maximizes (( ); )
I rephrase the transparency question for the case with monetary transfers as follows:
Question. Can it be beneficial for the designer that the agent be partially rather
than fully informed of ( )?
Compared to the case without monetary transfers, transparency is defined as a situ-
ation in which the agent knows the state  as well as the exact incentive scheme as defined
by  that prevails in . Observe that if the Principal were to choose a stochastic incentive
scheme (a distribution over ) and have the agent know the state  (but not the real-
ization of ), this would be considered as a form of non-transparency in the context of
the above question (even if I conjecture that a non-transparency result solely in terms of
partial disclosure of the state  is likely to hold even in cases in which stochastic contracts
are optimal).
The notion of genericity is the same as that introduced in Section 4 except that the
domain of  is now  = R × R × R given that  depends now also on the monetary
instruments  ∈ R. The non-transparency result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 3 Assume that there exist two distinct states 1, 2 in the interior of the -
space such that the same action would be chosen in the complete information benchmark,
i.e. ((1) 1) = ((2) 2), and that the utility function  is non- satiated. There
14This full support assumption typically implies that the first-best cannot be achieved in the full
information benchmark
15Such assumptions will typically guarantee that one can work with first-order conditions to deal with
the maximization problems of agents. To the extent that interior pure strategy equilibria exist and that
one focuses on these, the insights developed below would apply.
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exists a generic set Π such that for all objective functions  ∈ Π, the Principal can do
strictly better than disclosing fully the state  to the agent.
The idea of the proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. For each , definee(; ) = ((); ), and e(; ) = ( (); ). The genericity of  translates into the
genericity of e, and one can apply Proposition 1 to derive Proposition 3. The economic
intuition for this result is that even if the monetary instrument  is optimally adjusted to
the state , ( ; ) is not perfectly aligned with (; ) and thus the Principal can
gain by using a well chosen non-transparent disclosure policy.16
Of course, similarly to Theorem 1, I also observe that as soon as the dimension of the
state space  is larger than the dimension of the action space , i.e.   , one must
have two distinct states 1 and 2 such that ((1) 1) = ((2) 2) and thus some
form of non-transparency is desirable.
Discussion
1) The general issue as to whether transparency is desirable can be formulated in terms
of the following trade-oﬀ. If an agent receives incomplete information about the state , it
makes it easier to satisfy the incentive constraints of the agent through an appropriate use
of the monetary instruments. This is because incomplete information allows the Principal
to aggregate the various agent’s incentive constraints (for each state) into one incentive
constraint that is easier to satisfy. But, incomplete information forces the agent not to
be able to adjust his action to the state , which is sometimes harmful to the Principal.
In light of this, what Proposition 3 establishes is that one can always find information
structures in which the first eﬀect dominates the second, as soon as there are at least
two distinct states in which the action would be the same in the case in which the agent
knows the state.17
16Based on this intuition, I would expect the result of Proposition 3 to continue to hold even if the
observation made by the Principal were to take values on the continuum, but the formal argument would
require dealing with First Order Conditions in the space of bonus functions which would be technically
more challenging (as compared with dealing with local optima over finitely many bonuses for each possible
observation).
17Observe that in the derivation of this result, it is not the case that the first eﬀect is made of an
order greater than the second (the two eﬀects appear to be of comparable magnitude, but for well chosen
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2) The above result about the desirability of some form of non-transparency in the
presence of monetary instruments seems to be at odds with the conclusion obtained by
Rayo and Segal (2010) who show in their setup in which the state space has dimension 2
and the action space has dimension 1 that when monetary instruments are allowed, the
best disclosure policy is full transparency. They get at this conclusion by observing that
any outcome with partial disclosure (and possibly monetary incentives) can be replicated
with full disclosure and well chosen monetary instruments. Yet, the conclusion that full
disclosure of  is optimal can only hold for special (non-generic) specifications of the
Principal’s objective function , as shown in Proposition 3. Specifically, perturbing the
Principal’s objective with respect to  and  alone while maintaining the quasi-linearity
assumption regarding money in Rayo-Segal’s model would lead the Principal to find full
transparency suboptimal.18
3) In the above analysis, I have implicitly ignored agents’ participation constraints.
Consider now imposing that an agent should get at least his outside option payoﬀ. Clearly,
nothing changes if participation constraints are not binding.19 For example, in contexts
with limited liability, an agent typically receives a positive rent in moral hazard problems,
and the participation constraints are not binding. In the absence of limited liability
constraints though, the designer would typically adjust the instruments  so that the
agent gets his outside option payoﬀ in pure moral hazard problems (see Holmström (1979-
1982) or Holmström-Milgrom (1991) in the context of risk-averse agents without limited
liability constraints). It should be noted however that if in addition to the moral hazard
problem, the agent was assumed to possess some private information then most "types" of
the agent would receive positive rent even in the absence of limited liability constraints.
While dealing with such environments requires further analysis, I conjecture that the
above non-transparency result would still hold in this case.
4) In the context of optimal mechanisms, the most general form of mechanisms allows
information structures, the former dominates the latter).
18Inspecting the Appendix reveals that the perturbations of  used to prove Proposition 3 allow me to
keep  unchanged so that the genericity required is about how  depends on  and  (rather than ).
19If the participation constraints are binding both at  = 1 and 2 +  in the main argument used
to prove the above Proposition when  is set at () in state , one has to worry that the agent gets no
less than his outside option payoﬀ when the agent does not know whether  = 1 or 2 + , which may
require increasing the burden to the Principal.
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for the presence of a mediator who could make recommendations to the agent as to which
action to choose. When such mechanisms are available, one can always implement the
optimal mechanism by having the agent be only informed of what to do (which action 
to choose) (see Myerson, 1982). When several states induce the same action as considered
in the above Proposition, Myerson’s result implies that it is enough to let the agent know
what to do and that there is no gain in letting him know more. From that perspective,
what the above non-transparency result shows is the stronger property that under the
conditions of the above Proposition, the Principal can strictly improve upon what she can
achieve in the fully transparent case (which Myerson’s result does not imply).
5) Gjesdal (1982) was the first to note that stochastic contracts may sometimes help
the Principal achieve larger expected payoﬀs. His result though is of a very diﬀerent
nature than the one derived above as it does not rely on variations of the state.20
20Roughly, Gjesdal’s argument can be illustrated as follows. The reference to the state  will be
omitted from the agent and the principal’s utilities, since Gjesdal considers only one state. When the
agent chooses  and the principal chooses , I let () denote the utility of the agent and I assume
that the payoﬀ of the designer takes the linear form: () = − .
That is, the principal wishes to induce a high eﬀort level  from the agent, and she can aﬀect the choice
of  using monetary instrument  at some cost assumed to be linear in .
Gjesdal’s main observation is that if  () is convex in , then a stochastic contract increases the
expected utility of the Principal. To see this most simply, assume that instead of using a deterministic
, the principal chooses a stochastic contract that assigns probability 12 to 1 =  −  and probability
1
2 to 2 =  + . For any given , the first-order condition that determines the agent’s action is:
1
2

 (()  + ) +
1
2

 (()  − ) = 0 (4)
Total diﬀerentiation of (4) with respect to  and simple Taylor expansions yield:

 () = −
3
2 ((0) )
2
2 ((0) )
+ ()
where () → 0 as  → 0. Thus,  ()  0 for  small enough whenever 
3
2 ((0) )  0 (given that
2
2 ((0) )  0). This implies that when  () is convex in , the proposed stochastic contract does
strictly better than the original deterministic contract, since the expected monetary transfer is the same
in the two cases and the eﬀort level () is (slightly) bigger in the stochastic case than in the deterministic
case.
Thus, when  ((0) ) is convex in , any deterministic contract can be improved upon by using
a stochastic contract that is a (suﬃciently small) mean preserving spread of the original deterministic
contract.
Of course, when  ((0) ) is not convex in , it may be that no stochastic contract dominates the
best deterministic contract. So Gjesdal’s insight is not that in general optimal contracts are stochastic,
but rather than under some convexity conditions they may be stochastic. This is, of course, very diﬀerent
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6 On the art of staying silent
The above analysis has shown that full transparency is suboptimal whenever the same
action would be chosen by the agent at two distinct states, which in particular implies that
full transparency can be improved upon whenever the state space has a dimensionality
greater than the action space.
In this Section, I particularize the problem and I assume that the Principal can either
disclose fully the state or remain silent. I characterize the optimal way for the Principal
to remain silent in the class (P) of problems introduced at the end of Section 3.
Specifically, assume that
(; ) = − 
2
2
+
(; ) = + 0
Since  and  0 play no role in the comparison of the various disclosure policies, from
now on, I can assume without loss of generality that  =  0 = 0 and I identify  with
(  ).
If the agent is not told anything whenever  ∈ Θ∗, the agent picks action  = (|∈Θ∗)(|∈Θ∗)
in the case the Principal remains silent. Conditional on  ∈ Θ∗, the Principal thus gets
in expectation ( |  ∈ Θ∗)(|∈Θ∗)(|∈Θ∗) and compared to the fully transparent benchmark
in which the state  is always disclosed, the Principal gets an extra (possibly negative)
expected payoﬀ of
(Θ∗) = Pr( ∈ Θ∗)[( |  ∈ Θ∗) · ( |  ∈ Θ
∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗) −( ·

 |  ∈ Θ
∗)]
The best silence set is the set Θ∗ that maximizes (Θ∗).
Considering the marginal eﬀect of the addition (or subtraction) of some small neigh-
borhood of  = (  ) to (or from) Θ∗ yields the following characterization result:
Proposition 4 The optimal set of states Θ∗ over which the Principal should remain silent
from our non-transparency insight stipulating that when  has dimension bigger than , it is always best
not to let the agent know perfectly ( ).
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is of the form:
Θ∗ = { = (  ) such that ( −

 ) · (

 −

 ) ≤ 0}
where
 = ( |  ∈ Θ∗)
 = ( |  ∈ Θ∗)
 = ( |  ∈ Θ∗)
In order to see the shape of Θ∗, it is instructive to particularize in diﬀerent ways
Proposition 4.
Optimal silence set in the ( )-space
First, consider the case in which  is set at 1. Θ∗ is then of the form { = ( ) such
that ( − ) · ( − ) ≤ 0}. That is, the Principal should remain silent either when
   and    or when    and   . The corresponding area is depicted in
grey in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1
The intuition for the shape of Θ∗ in this case is that the bundling of states Θ =
{ = ( ) such that    and   } with states Θ = { = ( ) such that   
and   } is good for the Principal because it allows her to transfer the comparatively
high eﬀort made in Θ -this comparison can be inferred from  being larger in Θ than
in Θ - to Θ in which the Principal cares comparatively more about eﬀort than in
Θ -this comparison can be inferred from  being larger in Θ than in Θ. So here it
is the relative sensitivity to eﬀort of the Principal’s objective  in the various states that
explains the shape of the optimal silence set.
I have already noted that when  = 1, the above specification of payoﬀs results in the
same reduced form specification as the one considered by Rayo and Segal. The shape of
the optimal silence set in this case is somehow reminiscent of Rayo and Segal’s observation
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that the bundling of two states (1 1) and (2 2) into one information set is profitable
whenever the two states are unordered (i.e. if 1  2 then 1  2). Yet, the question
investigated here is not the bundling of two states but rather over which set of states
(which are many more than two) the Principal should remain silent, and Proposition 4
establishes a precise sense in which  and  should be negatively correlated in the optimal
silence set.
From the viewpoint of the moral hazard scenario considered in Section 3, assume
the heterogeneity lies only in the quality of the monitoring as measured by  as well
as the sensitivity of success to eﬀort as measured by . Phrased in the (  )-space,
this is a situation in which  can be held fixed. The naive approach in this application
would suggest remaining silent whenever the monitoring technology is of bad quality as
suggested in the Introduction. In the ( ) space, this would amount to remaining silent
whenever  −  is above some threshold. As can be seen from Proposition 4 or Figure
1, the optimal silence set is not of this form because if the Principal were to follow such
a (naive) disclosure policy, the agent would infer from the Principal remaining silent
that the monitoring technology must be poor and the absence of communication on the
state would then not be profitable. By contrast, what emerges as the optimal silence
set suggests a form of negative correlation between the monitoring technology and the
productivity of eﬀort as can be inferred from Figure 1 and how  and  relate to  and
 (see the end of Section 3).
Optimal silence set in the ( )-space
I next consider the case in which  is set at 1. Θ∗ is then of the form { = ( )
such that ( 1 − 1 ) · ( −  ) ≤ 0}. That is, the Principal should remain silent either when
   and    or when    and    . The corresponding area in the (  ) space
is depicted in grey in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2
The intuition for the shape of Θ∗ in this case is that the bundling of states Θ =
{ = ( ) such that    and    } with states Θ = { = ( ) such that   
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and    } is good for the Principal because it bundles high eﬀort states in Θ with
low eﬀort states in Θ ( is larger in Θ than in Θ ) and the agent’s utility is more
concave at states in Θ than at states in Θ (since  is larger in Θ than in Θ ).
So here it is the relative concavity in eﬀort of the agent’s utility at the various states that
explains the shape of the optimal silence set.
When the heterogeneity lies only in ( ) then some form of positive correlation
between  and  is desirable for the Principal in the precise sense depicted in Figure
2. For example, in the context of the moral hazard example introduced in Section 3, if
the heterogeneity lies only in the private benefit  and the decreasing returns to eﬀort in
the task as measured by , then the optimal silence requires a form of positive correlation
between  and .
Discussion
The above investigation can be looked at through the lens of how tasks should be
described in organizations so that agents make the best use of their time in the various
tasks. Indeed agents are typically involved in lots of tasks in organizations and how the
tasks are described will typically aﬀect how agents allocate their time and eﬀort across
tasks possibly including some training phases before the tasks must be fulfilled. Such a
problem fits in well with the above investigation if one has in mind that the cost of time
in a given task must include the opportunity cost of not being able to use extra time in
other tasks. The present section has considered when it is desirable not to describe finely
the task to the agent (the analog of remaining silent), and the above derived insights can
be used to shed light on this and also on the breadth of task assignment.
For example, suppose an employee of an organization must do some applied develop-
ment as well as pure research as well as some training of other employees. Within the toy
model presented in Section, these various tasks may correspond to diﬀerent realizations
of the state , but to fix ideas assume the main lines of diﬀerentiation of tasks lie in
how good the monitoring technology is as measured by  and how productive the eﬀort
is as measured by . Proposition 4 would suggest not to specify the task whenever the
monitoring technology is worst and productivity is highest (as for example is the case
with pure research) or when the monitoring technology is very good and productivity
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very low (as for example is the case with training) while describing the task more finely in
other cases (as for example here with applied development). The absence of clear defin-
ition of the task when faced with (pure) research jobs (which are typically bundled with
training/teaching elements) seems in line with this finding.21
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that some form of non-transparency is desirable, as long as in
the complete information benchmark, the same actions would be chosen by the agent(s)
for at least two distinct states. Based on this result, I would suggest that some form of
non-transparency is optimal quite generally, given that the state is likely to vary over
more dimensions than the action in most applications. I have also characterized the best
way to remain silent for a class of problems also suggesting how the insights so obtained
could be used to shed light on when tasks should not be described finely in organizations.
Clearly, more work should be devoted to understanding the best disclosure policy in more
general settings, in particular, how it interacts with the best use of monetary instruments.
21I am indebted to the editor for suggesting this interpretation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
I consider the case in which the action  may have arbitrary many dimensions. Let 1
and 2 be two states such that in the complete information case (1) = (2) = 1 and
consider a direction  and  small enough such that (2 + ) 6= (2).
Let 2() and () be defined by
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∇(1; 1) = 0
∇(2(); 2 + ) = 0
(1)∇((); 1) + (2 + )∇((); 2 + ) = 0
(5)
Let () denote the Jacobian of  at state . Total diﬀerentiation of (5) yields
2
 ( = 0) = −((2))
−1 · ∇(2)

 ( = 0) = −(2)[(1)(1) + (2)(2)]
−1 · ∇(2)
Let ∆() denote the expected organizational gain of not letting the agent know  = 1
or 2 +  relative to the full information case. We have:
∆()
 = −(1)∇(1; 1)·

 ( = 0)+(2)∇(1; 2)·[
2
 ( = 0)−

 ( = 0)]+()
where ()→ 0 as → 0.
One can conclude as in the case in which  is one-dimensional by noting that for
generic  functions
−(1)∇(1; 1) · 

 ( = 0)+ (2)∇(1; 2) · [
2
 ( = 0)−

 ( = 0)] 6= 0 (6)
which can be seen by considering the family of Principal’s objective
(; ) = (; ) +  k  − 2 k  · 

 ( = 0)
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If (; ) does not satisfy (6), (; ) will for small non-zero values of .
So we may now assume that not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2 + 
strictly dominates the full information case. Consider a small  and the eﬀect of not
letting the agent know the realization of  in (1) ∪ (2 + ) as compared with
the full information benchmark where () denotes the set of states which are at (euc-
lidean) distance no more than  from . Continuity of  and  implies that conditional
on  ∈ (1) ∪ (2 + ), this diﬀerence converges to ∆()((1) + (2 + )) as 
converges to 0 where ∆() is the function described above. It follows that there must
exist  small enough so that the Principal is strictly better oﬀ not letting the agent know
 ∈ (1) ∪(2 + ) as compared with the full information benchmark. Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
To present the argument in a more reader-friendly way, I restrict myself to the case in
which the action space has dimension 1 and there are two agents  and .
For any , () must solve: (  ( ; ) = 0
 ( ; ) = 0
Consider 1 and 2 such that  (1) =  (2) and consider a direction  of  such that
for  small enough (2 + ) 6= (1).
If agent  does not know whether  = 1 or 2 + , NE actions  (), 1() and
2() are given by:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩

 (() 1(); 1) = 0

 (() 2(); 2 + ) = 0
(1) (() 1(); 1) + (2 + ) (() 2(); 2 + ) = 0
And if there is full information, NE actions 1, 2(), 1 and 2() are given by:
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

 (1 1; 1) = 0

 (2() 2(); 2 + ) = 0
 (1 1; 1) = 0
 (2() 2(); 2 + ) = 0
I expand at order 1 in  (the diﬀ. of  in coarse vs full info)
∆() = (1)[(() 1(); 1)− (1 1; 1)] +
(2 + )[(() 2(); 2 + )]− (2() 2(); 2 + )]
Similarly to the one agent case if ∆0(0) 6= 0, then it implies that not letting agent 
know whether  = 1 or 2 +  with   0 or   0 but small strictly improves over the
full information benchmark and ∆0(0) = 0 can be shown to be non-generic by considering
perturbations of the form ( ; ) = ( ; ) +  k  − 1 k2 where k · k denotes
the Euclidean distance.
Proof of Proposition 3.
To make the argument more reader-friendly, assume the action of the agent  varies
over one dimension and let  denote the bonus obtained by the agent when the Principal
observes  ex post. For any , there is an optimal  = (), say (). It is defined as
() = argmax (() ; )
() = argmax (; )
Thus, keeping  constant on has:  (; ) = 0, which after complete diﬀerentiation
w.r.t  yields 22  + 
2
 = 0. The first-order condition on the designer’s programme
writes 

 +

 = 0, which combined with the previous condition yields:
−
2

2
2
+

 = 0
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Define e(; ) = ((); ) and e(; ) = ((); ). Apply the argument de-
veloped around Proposition 1 assuming e is the designer’s objective and e is the agent’s
utility function. Clearly, if not letting the agent know whether  = 1 or 2 +  strictly
dominates the complete information benchmark for this case, then in the case when the
designer can choose , it also strictly dominates (because the designer always has the
option to set  to be () in state ).
It remains to show that generically it is not the case that (see (2) above)
e
 (1)
2e
2 (2)−
e
 (2)
2e
2 (1) = 0 (7)
To see this, consider the family of  functions
(; ) = (; ) +  k  − 1 k2 (+
X

2
22 (2 (2); 2) · )
where  ∈ R. For such a family, () are the same at  = 1 (resp. 2) whatever  so
that  () =  +  k  − 1 k2 for  = 1 and 2. Thus, if e satisfies (7), e does not
for any suﬃciently small  6= 0, and one can conclude as in the case of Proposition 1. Q.
E. D.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof takes the following route. Consider a candidate set Θ∗ over which the
Principal is supposed to optimally stay silent. Let (Θ∗) be the probability that  falls
in Θ∗. Let ∗ = (∗ ∗ ∗) be a state in Θ and assume the probability that  = ∗ is ∗
which is assumed to be arbitrarily small as compared with (Θ∗).
Assume first that ∗ lies outside Θ∗. Letting () be the expected organizational
gain over full transparency when the Principal remains silent over states  ∈ , routine
calculations show that (Θ∗ ∪ {∗})−(Θ∗) writes at the first order in ∗:
−[
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗)][
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗) ]
∗
∗ (8)
Clearly if (8) is strictly positive, the Principal is strictly better oﬀ being silent over
Θ∗ ∪ {∗} than over Θ∗ and thus Θ∗ is not optimal (in the case of smooth densities,
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replacing {∗} by a small neighborhood of ∗ would do using continuity arguments). This
implies that for all ∗ ∈ Θ∗, one should have:
[
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗)][
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗) ] ≥ 0
Assume next that ∗ ∈ Θ∗ Then the same calculation yields that(Θ∗)−(Θ∗\{∗})
has the same sign as
−[
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗)][
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗) ]
and thus the optimality of Θ∗ implies that for every ∗ ∈ Θ∗, one should have:
[
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗)][
∗
∗ −
( |  ∈ Θ∗)
( |  ∈ Θ∗) ] ≤ 0
It follows that the optimal silence set Θ∗ has the form shown in Proposition 4. Q. E.
D.
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